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4.

JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT AND DESCRIPTION
AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Jurisdiction

comes

from

certification

"final" pursuant to Utah Rules

of Civil

of

an

Procedure

Order

as

54(b) and

Utah Code 78-2-2(3) (i) .
Provo City
Utah

and

connection

filed

Staker
with

suit

Paving

blockage

water and caused

(Record

because
of

1) against the State of
of

freeway

damages

culverts

damage to Provo City.

suffered

in

that backed

up

Discovery, pleadings

and settlement negotiations were progressing until the State of
Utah turned the file over to a private law firm representing
the State's excess coverage carrier.

That firm, on behalf of

the State, filed a Summary Judgment Motion (Record 180).
The motion was granted (Record 432) (attached as Addendum
1) on the grounds that the State had immunity pursuant to Utah
Code Section 63-30-3.
The trial court certified the Order as "final" pursuant
to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 54(b) (Record 415) (attached
as Addendum 2 ) .
5.
The

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES FOR REVIEW

issues

Governmental

presented

Immunity

Act

to
is

the

Court

applicable

face

of

a

Section

63-30-3

gives

to the State of Utah for obstructing

natural

there

are
-1-

Code

the

the

question,

drainageways, whether

Utah

in

whether

constitutional
immunity

whether

are

express

waivers
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(Utah

Code

63-30-8, 63-30-9 and 63-30-10) and whether there are questions
of fact that preclude summary

judgment for the State of Utah

that entitle Provo City to a jury trial.
6.

PERTINENT STATUTES, CONSTITUTIONAL
ISSUES AND RULES FOR DETERMINATION

Utah Code Annotated Section 63-30-2(4)(a) (Repl. 1986) Addendum 6
Utah Code Annotated Section 63-30-3 (Repl. 1986) - Addendum 7
Utah Code Annotated Section 63-30-8 (Repl. 1986) - Addendum 8
Utah Code Annotated Section 63-30-9 (Repl. 1986) - Addendum 9
Utah Code Annotated Section 63-30-10 (Repl. 1986) - Addendum 10
Utah Code Annotated Section 68-3-11 (Repl. 1986 - Addendum 11
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2-2(3)(i) (Repl. 1987) Addendum 12
Utah Constitution, Article I Section 7 - Addendum 3
Utah Constitution, Article I Section 22 - Addendum 4
United States Constitution, Amendment 5 - Addendum 5
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(b)
(1953, 1988 ed.) - Addendum 13
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 56(c)
(1953, 1988 ed.) - Addendum 14
7.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case.

The State of Utah built the 1-15

freeway in 1964.

That freeway acts as a large dam between the

mountains

east

to the

across the natural
concentrated
the

freeway.

and

Utah

Lake to the west by cutting

surface drainage.

The State diverted

and

the natural surface drainage into culverts under
In

1984, Provo

City

was

constructing

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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a

golf

course

east

of

and

adjacent

to

the

1-15

freeway.

At

approximately the same time, the Utah Department of Transportation was extending the culverts to be able to place dikes along
the freeway between the University offramp (in south Provo) and
the Ironton offramp (north Springville).
of

construction

it

was

determined

Prior to commencement

that

the

culverts

were

blocked with various levels of silt and material.
During the process of extending the culverts, they were
blocked

off

with

large

dams

called

coffer

dams.

After

the

coffer dams were supposed to have been removed, the water on
the east side of the 1-15 freeway stayed at a higher level than
normal and at a higher level than water on the west side of
1-15

freeway

historical

for

approximately

high water peak.

because the water

three

months

past

the

usual

Provo City property was damaged

level on the east side of the freeway was

higher than usual for a period longer than usual.
B.

Course

of

the Proceedings.

Discovery

complete, pleadings were not yet fully

refined

was not yet
by amendment,

narrowing of the issues in preparation for trial was ongoing,
and

settlement

negotiations

were

still

Summary Judgment Motion was granted

proceeding

when

the

in favor of the State of

Utah.
C.

Disposition at Trial Court.

The trial court granted

the State of Utah's Motion for Summary Judgment

(Record 180).

The trial judge certified the Order as "final" pursuant to Utah

-3Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Rules of Civil Procedure 54(b) (Record 432) and Provo City as
well as other parties filed a timely appeal (Record 461).

a

D.

Relevant Facts with Citations to Record.

1.

The 1-15 freeway built by the State of Utah serves as

large

dam

Mountains

to

across
the

the

east

natural

toward

drainage

Utah

Lake

courses
to

the

from

west

the
(Kemp

deposition, page 108).
2.

The State of Utah failed to maintain the drainage by

allowing the culverts under the freeway to become obstructed so
that

prior

to

the

construction

project, they

were

partially

full of silt (Kemp deposition, page 112; Peterson deposition,
pages 14, 16, 17 and 38).
3.

Although

advised

of the problem, the State of Utah

refused to take any action to maintain the culverts and clear
the

obstruction

prior

to

construction

(Peterson

deposition,

pages 38-39; Kemp deposition, pages 113, 115, and 117; Kjelsrud
deposition, pages 23-24).
4.

If

the

culverts

had

been

properly

maintained

and

open, the northernmost box culvert had the capacity to handle
three times the peak

flow generated

east side of the 1-15 freeway

from all sources on the

(Kemp deposition, pages 109 and

111) .
5.

The northernmost

box culvert was blocked

March 19,

1984 (Keyes deposition, page 12). The 60-inch pipe was blocked
on March 30, 1984 (Keyes deposition, page 13).
-4Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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A coffer dam

6.

is a temporary

water from entering an area
35)

built

by

deposition,

pushing

page

12)

dam placed

to prevent

(Wilson deposition, pages 17 and

dirt

wide

out

8-9

feet

high

(Peterson

enough

for

a

trackhoe

(Peterson

deposition, page 35; Kjelsrud deposition, page 10).
7.

The coffer dams were built by Staker Paving (Peterson

deposition, pages 10, 11, 40 and 120; Kjelsrud deposition, page
10) .
8.

The

coffer

dams

were

removed

by

Staker

Paving

or

their subcontractors (Peterson deposition, page 12).
9.

When

it came

time to remove

the coffer

dams, the

operator of the backhoe could not see the underwater portion of
the coffer dams (Peterson deposition, pages 21-22).
10.

It was difficult, if not impossible, to tell if all

of the material had been removed

(Peterson deposition, pages

21-22).
11.
engineer

The Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) project
felt that there was

still

some material

left

after

removal attempts (Keyes deposition, page 43).
12.

The

UDOT

project

engineer

acknowledged

that

the

coffer dams became saturated and unstable so the backhoe could
not go far enough out to remove

all of

the material

(Keyes

deposition, pages 13-14).
13.

Provo tried for four months to get the Department of

Transportation to respond to the problem of higher water on the

-5Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

east

side

of

1-15

After

Utah Lake

still

in place

freeway

(Kemp deposition, pages

158-159).

receded, partial coffer dams were discovered
on

the

west

side

of

the

1-15

freeway

(Kemp

deposition, page 188).
14.

The partial coffer dams were holding back water on

the east side of 1-15 freeway (Kemp deposition, pages 171-172).
15.

The spring runoff in 1984 started before the coffer

dam construction was completed and the culverts were extended
(Kemp deposition, page 189) because the contractor got behind
schedule

(Kemp deposition, page

189; Keyes deposition, pages

39-40).
16.

The water on the Utah Lake side covered the top of

the culverts (Kemp deposition, page 188; Keyes deposition, page
11) .
17.

The UDOT project engineer was aware that the water

was not flowing through at least one culvert (Keyes deposition,
pages 22-23).
18.
bring

this

The

UDOT

problem

project
to

manager

anyone's

did

attention

not

investigate

(Keyes

or

deposition,

pages 22-23 ) .
19.

There was high water on the east side of the 1-15

freeway from June until mid-September

(Kemp deposition, pages

92-96).
20.

The cause jot

damage to Provo City was not high water

from flooding but a backup of water caused by an obstruction in

-6-
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the

culverts

under

1-15

freeway

(Kemp deposition, page

198)

which created high water on the east side of the 1-15 freeway
and caused damage to Provo City property (Kemp deposition, page
198).
21.

The contractor was to have culvert

extension work

done before the spring runoff (Kemp deposition, page 189).
22.

1984 was projected to be similar to 1983 as far as

the level of Utah Lake was concerned

(Kemp deposition, pages

50, 67 and 93) .
23.

Staker Paving

chose the method

of construction of

extending the culverts (Keyes deposition, page 7 ) .

The method

chosen was the use of coffer dams to hold water back so the
area could be pumped dry to do the necessary culvert extensions
(Keyes deposition, pages 11-12).

There were alternate methods

of construction (Kemp deposition, pages 161-162).
24.

The construction project fell behind schedule (Kemp

deposition, page

189; Keyes deposition, page

39-40; Kjelsrud

deposition, page 19).
25.

The State of Utah knew the inherent danger created

by blocking
freeway.

the culverts

under

the dam

created

by

the

1-15

This was evidenced by their concern not to block all

the culverts at one time, to block

the culverts only

for a

short duration and its concern about having the work completed
before the normal runoff (Kemp deposition, pages 164, 189).
26.

The State of Utah engineered

the construction

job

(Keyes deposition, page 5) and did the inspection of the work
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-7-

on the construction

project

daily

(Peterson

deposition, page

29-30; Kjelsrud deposition, page 13).

8.

The
damaging
which

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

State of Utah's
property

violations

conduct

violates
are

in

f

trespass, nuisance

constitutionally

not protected

--,

protected

by governmental

and

rights

immunity.

Even if such conduct were protected by governmental immunity,
Utah Code Section 63-30-3, there is no provision for absolute
immunity

contained

in

the

Governmental

Immunity

Act.

The

legislature has provided waivers for specific activities (Utah
Code 63-30-8, 63-30-9, and 63-30-10) even where a government is
engaged in a governmental
landowner, blocked
1-15

freeway

both

the

a natural

and owed

1984

function.

The State of Utah, as a

drainageway

by

a duty to Provo City

construction

project

and

the

constructing

the

that pre-existed
March

29,

1984

amendment to Utah Code Section 63-30-3 which added management
of flood water as a governmental function.

. .

Whether or not the

. -8-
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activity

that

did

damage

to

Provo

City

property

was

flood

related or was a pre-existing condition is a question of fact
that should be submitted to a jury.
of

the

1-15

freeway

preceded

the

Because the construction
1-15

diking

project

and

because of the duty owed to adjacent landowners by the State of
Utah, Provo City is entitled to a trial on the merits.

9.

ARGUMENT
POINT I

THIS ACTION CAN BE MAINTAINED AGAINST THE STATE OF UTAH.
The right to sue a state in either the federal or state
court

is

not

derived

from

the Constitution

or

laws of

the

United States, but can only come from consent of the State.
Gross v. Washington
1962).

State Ferries, 367 P.2d

600

(Washington,

A State, as a sovereign, is immune from suit unless it

consents to be sued.

Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah,

1983).
The

activities, operations, and contracts of

the state

government and other public entities are protected from suit by
the doctrine of sovereign immunity, Campbell v. Park, 389 P.2d
464 (Utah, 1964) and only the legislature can waive sovereign
immunity, Bailey

Service

and

Supply

Utah, 533 P.2d 882 (Utah, 1975).

Corporation

v. State of

The Supreme Court of Utah has

held that where there is a general preservation of governmental
immunity

any

exception

must

be

clearly

stated

-9Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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within

the

provisions of the statute.

Epting v. State of Utah, 546 P.2d

242, 244 (Utah, 1976) •
Going back to the time when there were courts of law and
courts

of

equity

and

coming

to

us

through

the

common

law,

matters of equity are exceptions to governmental immunity.
Rancho Enterprises v. Murray City Corp., 565 P.2d

778

El

(Utah,

1977) Bowles v. State of Utah, 652 P.2d 1345 (Utah, 1982).
It seems too plain to have to restate that the rights
protected

by

the

constitution

cannot

be

compromised

by

the

legislature without amending the constitution.
The clear implication of these holdings together with the
Governmental Immunity Act is that the legislature has affirmatively created the right to sue the state and the courts have
defined and protected that right.
POINT II
TRESPASS, NUISANCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM
ARE NOT CUT OFF BY GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY.
A.

CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM.

No person can be deprived of property without due process
of

law

(Utah

Constitution

Article

I Section

7) and

private

property cannot be taken or damaged for public use without just
compensation (Utah Constitution Article I Section 22).

Similar

protections

to

the

Constitution of the United States by the Fifth Amendment.

The

Supreme

are

Court

of

provided

the

in

United

the

Bill

States

has

of

Rights

held

-10Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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that

even

a

"temporary" taking is compensable.
Church of Glendale

v. County

First Evangelical Lutheran

of Los Angeles, 107 S.Ct. 2378

(1987).
The construction of the 1-15 freeway by the State of Utah
altered the natural flow of surface waters and channeled them
into culverts.

The culverts were allowed to become plugged and

in conjunction with the construction project the culverts were
blocked

by coffer dams.

Although notified

repeatedly

of the

problem, the State of Utah did not take action to eliminate the
blockage.

These

trespass, nuisance

actions
and

by

the

State

a temporary

of

taking

Utah

resulted

of property

in

which

resulted in damage to Provo City.
Because
supersede

constitutional

legislative

rights

acts there

protecting

is no governmental

property
immunity

for the constitutional claim and Provo City is entitled to a
trial on the merits rather than dismissal by summary judgment.
B.

THE STATE OF UTAH IS LIABLE FOR TRESPASS AND NUISANCE

WITHOUT REGARD TO GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY.
The first culvert was blocked

by constructing

a coffer

dam on March 19, 1984 (Keyes deposition, page 12). That coffer
dam was on the northernmost culvert that carried approximately
80 percent

of the water

off of the area in which Provo was

constructing the golf course and the culvert was sized to carry
three times the peak flow from all sources on the east side of
1-15 freeway (Kemp deposition, pages 109, 111; Kemp affidavit,
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Record No, 214 at 216).
by

construction

of

a

The 60-inch culvert was blocked next

coffer

dam

commencing

March

30,

1984

(Keyes deposition, page 13).
The amendment to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act for
the

management

1984.

of

flood

waters

became

effective

March

29,

The forces by which the State of Utah caused damage to

Provo City were set in motion prior to the time any immunity
was granted for flooding by the amendments to Utah Code Section
63-30-3.
Provo was denied
when

the

Summary

granted
Based

by

on

the

Judgment
lower

information

complaint

the opportunity

upon remand

Motion

court

of

to complete discovery

the

December

2,

discovered, Provo

State
1987

of

Utah

was

(Record 360).

intends

to

amend

its

to include allegations of trespass and

nuisance.
The State of Utah as a landowner built the 1-15 freeway.
That

freeway

interfered

with

the

natural

mountains and now acts as a large dam.
108.)

The

culverts

under

the

1-15

drainage

from

the

(Kemp deposition, page
freeway

were

partially

plugged with silt prior to the commencement of the construction
project
112).

(Petersen

deposition, page

38; Kemp deposition, page

The silting was brought to the attention of the State

but it decided not to clean the culverts (Peterson deposition,
pages

38-39;

Kemp

deposition,

pages

113,

115, 117).

Provo

tried for four months to get UDOT to respond to the problem of
-12Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the higher water on the east side of the 1-15
deposition, pages 158-159).
maintained

and

open

the

freeway

(Kemp

If the culverts had been properly
northernmost

box

culvert

had

the

capacity to handle three times the peak flow generated from all
sources

on

the

east

side

of

the

1-15

freeway.

(Kemp

has the right to be free of water

causing

deposition, pages 109 and 111).
A landowner

damage on his land as a result of that water not being able to
follow the natural drainage course.
413 P.2d 300, 302 (Utah, 1966).

Reeder v. Brigham City,

The State of Utah should be

liable to Provo City since the State of Utah caused water to be
diverted

from

its

natural

drainage

course

damage.

to

Provo

City's

existed

prior

to the

. •

In

addition

to

the

silting

that

commencement of construction, the State, through an independent
contractor, placed

coffer

dams

at

each

end

of

the

culverts

under 1-15 freeway which further blocked the natural drainage
of the area east of the 1-15 freeway as discussed above.
Interference with the normal flow of surface water across
or on another's
rules

applicable

land
to

may

create

private

liability

nuisance

if

under the general
the

invasion

is

intentional and unreasonable under rules of private nuisance.
Morgan

v. Quailbrook

Condominium

Company,

407 P.2d

573, 576

(Utah, 1985).

The Oregon Supreme Court held that without the

consent

adjoining

of

an

property

owner, a landowner
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has no

right to unreasonably interrupt or retard natural flow of water
and no right to

throw water

back

upon

adjoining

landowners.

Wimmer v. Compton, 560 P.2d 626 (Oregon, 1977).
The State of Utah knew of the inherent danger created by
blocking

the

culverts

under

freeway.

This was evidenced

the

dam

created

by

the

1-15

by its concern not to block all

the culverts at the same time, to block them for only a short
duration, and to complete the work before the normal runoff.
(Kemp deposition, pages 164 and 189).

;

It is a question of fact whether or not the 1-15 freeway
contruction

which

acts

as

a

dam,

qualifies

as

a

hazardous

activity raising the doctrine of strict liability or whether it
is

a

diversion

of

such

long-standing

that

it

has

become a

permanent feature such that the State cannot be found strictly
liable

(Markiewicz

v.

Salt

River

Valley

Water

Association, 576 P.2d 517, 523 (Arizona, 1978).
maintain

the

installation

culverts
of coffer

under

the

freeway

dams which

The failure to

aggravated

obstructed

Users

flows

by

the

from

the

natural drainage area create the condition for the application
of the doctrine of strict liability.

Sanford v. University of

Utah, 488 P.2d 741, 745 (Utah, 1971).
The State has a duty to maintain the culverts under the
1-15

freeway

waters.

in

That

obstructions

a good

duty
or

operating

includes

conditions

condition

keeping
that

would

the

to

absorb

culverts

restrict
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the

storm

free

of

flows.

Markiewicz v. Salt River Valley Water Users Association, 576
P.2d 517, 523 (Arizona, 1978).
The

coffer

deposition,
Staker

pages

removed

extending
coffer

dams
10

the

on

120).

coffer

dams

the

(Peterson

on

the

Staker
a

culverts

were

(Peterson

subcontractor

by Staker

they

Staker

by

Hikiau,

helped

culverts

deposition, page 12).
backhoe

built

and

and Gall-egos was

dams

large

were

of

Hikiau

was

in removing

the

extending

(Peterson

removed the coffer dams with a

deposition,

page

14), but

it

was

difficult, if not impossible, to tell if all of the material
from

the

pages

coffer

21-22)

dams

had

because

been

the

removed

water

(Peterson deposition,

was

so

high

(Peterson

deposition, pages 20-21).
The

State

of

Utah

engineered

the

construction

(Keyes

deposition, page 5) and did daily inspections of the work on
the construction project (Peterson deposition, pages 29 and 30).
Provo

is

entitled

trespass, nuisance
exercise
land

that

owned

and

degree

by Provo

to

a

whether

of care
and

trial
the

State

necessary

thus was

on

the
of

questions
Utah

to protect

a proximate

failed

of
to

adjoining

cause

of the

damage.
POINT III
UTAH CODE SECTION 63-30-3 DOES NOT PROVIDE
IMMUNITY TO THE STATE OF UTAH AND/OR
ITS CONTRACTORS (STAKER PAVING).
The Utah Governmental

Immunity Act, Utah Code Annotated

Section 63-30-3 as amended preserves immunity to the State and
-15-
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subsequent

Sections

of

the

act

waive

sovereign

immunity

in

certain specific actions, Rice v. Granite School District, 456
P.2d 159 (Utah, 1969) .
The

Utah

legislature

Governmental

in

1965

Government Code.

as

Immunity

Title

63

Code

was adopted

Chapter

30

of

by the

the

Utah

Utah Code Section 63-30-3 is a reservation of

immunity to governmental entities.
Utah

Act

Annotated

(63-30-5,

Subsequent sections of the
63-30-6,

63-30-7,

63-30-8,

63-30-9, 63-30-10 with exception, and 63-30-10.5) are clearly
intended by the legislature to be waivers of that immunity.
The language of Section 63-30-3 provides in part:
Except as may be otherwise provided in this
chapter, all governmental entities are immune from
suit from any injury which results from the
exercise of a governmental function...
The

language

stating
to

the

"except
specific

as

may

waivers

be
in

otherwise

provided"

refers

subsequent

sections.

The legislature added language to Utah Code Section

63-30-3 which became effective March 29, 1984 as follows:
The management of flood waters and other natural
disasters
and
the
construction,
repair,
and
operation
of
flood
and
storm
systems
are
considered
to be governmental
functions, and
governmental
entities
and
their
officers and
employees are immune from suit for any injury or
damage resulting from those activities.
The right of Provo City to maintain an action against the
state

can

derive

from

the

finding

that

the

injury

did

not

result from the exercise of a governmental function, or from a
finding

that

even

though

the

injury

did

result

-16Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

from

a

governmental

function,

that

governmental

immunity

has

been

expressly waived. Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah, 1983).
A.
This

GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION.
court

redefined

governmental

function

in

the

benchmark case of Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp, 605 P.2d
1230, 1236-1237 (Utah, 1980) as follows:
We therefore hold that the test for determining
governmental
immunity
is whether the activity
under consideration is of such a unique nature
that it can only be performed by a governmental
agency or that it is essential to the core of
government.
The Standiford

court

then held that the operation of a

golf course was not essential to governing
not a governmental

function.

That decision was reached with

full knowledge that the municipality
as

other

courses.

municipalities
The

holding

often

was

and therefore was

do

amplified

(Salt Lake City) as well
operate
when

municipal

the

court

golf

decided

Thomas v. Clearfield City, 642 P.2d 737 (Utah, 1982) and found
that collection and disposal of sewage, though often associated
with the operations of municipalities, is not essential to the
core of government activity.

Citing the Thomas case, the Court

pointed out in Dalton v. Salt Lake Suburban Sanitary Dist., 676
P.2d

399

(Utah,

1984)

that

the

claim

requirements

of

the

Governmental Immunity Act were not required or applicable for a
negligence action against the District because the operation of
the system was not a governmental function.
-17-
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The

principle

considered
unique

that

the

action

to be a governmental

nature

that

only

or

function

government

activity

must

can

be of

perform

being
such a

it,

was

reaffirmed in Johnson v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 629 P.2d
432, 434

(Utah, 1981).

In Johnson this court reaffirmed the

point that there is no immunity for negligence if government is
not

performing

a

governmental

function.

This

result

reached by referring to the Standiford test above.
again reaffirmed

was

The Court

its position in Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d

627, 629 (Utah, 1983) .
The legislature broadened the definition of governmental
function, Utah

Code

Section

63-30-2(4)(a)

effective

in 1987.

The facts and circumstances of this case took place before that
date.

Even

time, the

if the new definition
special

waivers

had

discussed

been

in place

below would

at the

allow Provo

City to maintain its lawsuit.
Applying the foregoing to the facts and circumstances of
this

appeal

demonstrates

that

the

State

of

Utah

was

not

performing a government function and is not immune to an action
for negligence (Utah Code Section 63-30-10).

It would make no

sense to hold

culverts under a

that

the failure to maintain

freeway or the failure to remove or the negligent
coffer dams is essential

to governing

when

removal of

it has been held

that a public health activity like the disposal of sewage is
not essential to governing and is not a governmental function.
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To make such a holding would make a mockery of the definition
and application of governmental function.

The legislature has

provided express waivers even where the activity is found to be
a govermental function.
The State of Utah built the 1-15 freeway.

This freeway

moves traffic through Utah County but it also serves as a large
dam

across

the

natural

drainage

(Kemp deposition, page 108).
the freeway
maintain

the

courses

by

the

mountains

The State placed culverts under

to facilitate the drainage.
drainage

from

allowing

the

The State failed to
culverts

under

the

freeway to become obstructed so that prior to the construction
project they were partially full of silt (Kemp deposition, page
112; Peterson deposition, page 38).

Although advised

of the

problem, the State refused to take any action to maintain the
culverts and clear the obstruction (Peterson deposition, pages
30-39; Kemp deposition, pages 113, 115 and 117).
Then, the State started the "dike project" in the early
Spring of 1984.

It proceeded to block off the culverts which

provide the drainage from the mountains by constructing large
coffer dams to hold back the water while extensions were made
to

existing

culverts

under

the

1-15

freeway.

The

work

got

behind schedule (Kjelsrud deposition, page 19; Kemp deposition,
page

189; Keyes

deposition, pages

39-40).

The

rising

water

covered the top of the culverts and much of the coffer dams.
When it came time to remove the coffer dams, the operator of
-19Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the backhoe could not see the underwater portion of the coffer
dams

(Peterson deposition, pages 21-22) and

if not

impossible, to tell

removed

(Peterson deposition, pages 21-22).

it was difficult,

if all of the material

had been

The UDOT project

engineer was aware that the coffer dams were so saturated that
the backhoe could not go out far enough to remove all of the
material

(Keyes deposition, pages 13-14),

after Utah Lake receded, partial coffer

Four months later,
dams were discovered

still in place (Kemp deposition, page 188) which were holding
back water on the east side of 1-15 freeway

(Kemp deposition,

pages 171-172) .
The

decision

to

within the Standiford
land

for

build
test

its placement.

a

freeway

as* would

would

the decision

by

government

fall

to condemn

However, at some point, to claim a

high degree of uniqueness or core activity
performed

logically

is untenable.

It

that can only be
has

been

held

in

Illinois for example that pothole maintenance on the roads is
not a governmental function.
(Illinois,
Young

1969).

University

maintained
freeways

One

in Provo

privately.
is

has

done

to

look

actual

private

construction work

done on the

1-15

done

contractors.

To

by

Standiford

private

no

as an example

The
by

Lusietto v. Kingan, 246 M.E.2d 24
further
of

contractors.

say

the

Brigham

roads built

construction

freeway

than

work
The

on

and
most

actual

dike project

was

project

the

test as to uniqueness or core government
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met

activity

necessary

for

governing

would

torture

reality.

Although

in

Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d 1117, 1120 (Utah, 1975) there was a
discussion

in

discretionary
highway
that

regard

to

whether

function

in

a case

project

even

that

though

caused

high

or

not

an

involving

the

flooding, this

level

decisions

action
design

Court

and

was

of a

recognized

actions

protected, lower level activity and the actual

a

may

be

implementation

are not.
The actual language added to Utah Code Section 63-30-3 in
March 29, 1984 reads:
The management of flood waters and other natural
disasters
and
the
construction,
repair, and
operation
of
flood
and
storm
systems
by
governmental
entities
are
considered
to
be
governmental functions, and governmental entities
and their officers and employees are immune from
suit for any injury or damage resulting from those
activities.
There
history

is

or

nothing

anywhere

in

the

else

language,

that

would

in

the

legislative

indicate

that

the

legislature intended to do anything other than add explanation
as to what constitutes a governmental function.
provision

in

the

statutory

scheme

unmodified by waivers or exceptions.

for

There is no

absolute

immunity

Utah Code Section 63-30-3

is subject to the waivers the legislature has provided.
B.

WAIVER OF IMMUNITY.

It would
policy,

be manifestly

to allow

the

State

unfair, as well as poor public
of Utah

to

avoid

-21Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

liability

and

exposure

which

provisions

it

would

expressly

otherwise

waiving

be

immunity,

subject
by

to

under

interpreting

the
Utah

Code Section 63-30-3 as an absolute immunity.

The legislative

scheme gives no such protection.

held

This

Court

that

full

compliance with the statute is necessary to maintain an action
under the Governmental

Immunity

School District, 531 P.2d

Act.

Scarborough

480, 482 (Utah, 1975).

that holding, and in the supplanting of common
immunity

through

the

Immunity Act, is the
statutory scheme.

legislatively

requirement

of

strict

Governmental

adherence

to the

Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627, 629 (Utah,

This strict adherence cuts both ways.

binding

on

government

Implicit in
law sovereign

enacted

1983).

those

v. Granite

making

being bound.

claims
The

on

scheme

It is equally

government

as

it

is

on

is clear.

The State of

Utah has reserved immunity to itself except as waived.
The preamble words to Utah Code Section 63-30-3

"Except

as may be otherwise provided" invite attention to those express
waivers in the sections subsequent to Section 63-30-3.

Words

are to be read according to their context and approved usage of
the

language.

1986) .

Section

68-3-11

Utah

Code

Annotated

(Repl.

The language on immunity for the management of flood

waters was adopted March 29, 1984.

Because of the modifying

preamble language to the section it could appropriately be read:
The management of flood waters and other natural
disasters
and
the construction,
repair, and
operation
of
flood
and
storm
systems
by
-22Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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governmental
entities
are
considered
to be
governmental functions, and governmental entities
and their officers and employees are immune from
suit for any injury or damage resulting from
those activities, except as may otherwise be
provided.
Utah Code Section 63-30-3 reserves immunity to the State
of

Utah

except

as

waived.

63-30-10 Utah Code Annotated

Sections

63-30-8,

63-30-9

and

(Repl. 1986) are express waivers

of the immunity reserved in Section 63-30-3.

That the State of

Utah anticipated specific waivers for the areas set out in Utah
Code Sections 63-30-8, 63-30-9 and 63-30-10 is clear from the
legislation itself as well as the discussion by this Court in
Holt v. Utah State Road Commission, 511 P.2d
(Utah, 1973);

Andrus

1286, 1287-1288

v. State of Utah, 541 P.2d

1117, 1120

(Utah, 1975) and more recently in Standiford v. Salt Lake City
Corp., 605 P.2d 1230, 1236 (Utah, 1980).
Utah Code Sections

63-30-8

and

63-30-9

expressly

waive

immunity for injury caused by dangerous or defective condition
of any public highway or road or for dangerous or defective
condition

of

any

public

public improvement.

structure, dam,

categorized

maintenance

government

function

virtue

63-30-8

activity.
1985).

or

other

This court found that the legislature had

inherently

Section

reservoir

by

waived

Richards

v.

of

of
the

governmental
Leavitt,

716

a

public

fact

that

immunity
P.2d

276,

way

as

a

Utah

Code

for

that

278

(Utah,

To now hold that adding the flood language to Utah Code
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63-30-3

created

clarifying what

an

absolute

constitutes

immunity

rather

a governmental

than

function

just

would

be

stretching beyond what the legislature created and beyond what
the logic in previous holdings has supported.

-

Utah Code Section 63-30-10 acts as an express waiver of
Section

63-30-3

with

specified

exceptions.

Further,

any

immunity reserved to the state under Utah Code Section 63-30-10
for performing

a discretionary

function, failing

to make

an

inspection or making an inadequate inspection does not modify
Utah

Code

Section

63-30-8

or

Section

63-30-9,

Sanford

v.

University of Utah, 488 P.2d 741, 745 (Utah, 1971).
The similarities between Sanford and this case before the
Court are striking and should be dispositive.
dealt

with

an

intentional

alteration

of

a

The Sanford case
natural

drainage

system which concentrated the flow and resulted in damage.
of

those

elements

are

present

in

this

case.

The

All
jury

instructions given by the Sanford trial court (page 743) could
well be jury instructions for this case.
The Sanford Court adopted the "reasonable use" doctrine
(page

744)

and

in

referring

to

the

restatement

of

torts

observed that of the three types of conduct that may result in
liability for private nuisance, the one that occurs most often
is:
Intentional . . . in the sense that defendant
has created or continued the condition causing the
nuisance with full knowledge that the harm to the
plaintiff's interests is substantially certain to
follow.
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The Court at page 745 then observed that nuisance arises
out of the interests invaded or the damage or harm inflicted
rather than from what the defendant has done.

The Court then

stated:
Today liability for a nuisance may rest upon an
intentional invasion of the plaintiff's interests,
or a negligent one, or a conduct which is abnormal
and out of place in its surroundings, and so falls
fairly within the principle of strict liability.
The
63-30-8

Court
and

reference

to

invasion.

concluded

Utah
the

Code
type

of

that

Section

63-30-9)
conduct

8 and

waived
which

9

(Utah

immunity

caused

the

Code

without
harm

or

After setting forth the Governmental Immunity Act's

definition

of

injury

(Utah

Code

Section

63-30-2[6])

(now

63-30-2[5]) the Court stated:
This broad definition of injury when construed
in connection with the language of Section 9
indicates a legislative intent to include within
the waiver of immunity an action for private
nuisance insofar as the action is predicated on a
dangerous or defective condition of a public
improvement that unreasonably interferes with the
use and enjoyment of the claimantfs property.
488 P.2d at 745.
This holding in Sanford and the waiver of negligence in
Utah Code Section 63-30-10 are sufficient to enable Provo City
to

go

to

trial

on

the

merits

dismissal by summary

judgment.

freeway

natural

across

the

rather

than

be

subject

The State of Utah built
drainage

way

and

allowed

culverts to become plugged prior to any construction.
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to
the
the

Then the

State allowed the culverts to be blocked by coffer dams during
construction

and either

failed

to remove them or negligently

only partially removed them causing damage to Provo City up to
three months after the peak high water.
The waivers pertinent to Provo City's claim against the
State

of

Utah

63-30-10.

are

Utah

Code

Sections

63-30-8,

63-30-9

and

If Section 63-30-3 is waived by a subsequent section

or, if the work was not flood related, or if the work was not a
governmental function, then Provo City is entitled, under the
law, to a trial on the merits.
C.

THE STATE CANNOT AVOID LIABILITY BECAUSE OF WORK DONE

BY AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR.
The State of Utah is seeking to evade responsibility and
liability

for

the

work

of

Staker

Paving.

Staker

Paving

is

trying to slip into a position of immunity by claiming to be an
employee of the State of Utah.

Provo is caught in the middle.

The case of Budagher v. Amrep Corp., 637 P.2d 547, (New
Mexico, 1981) (reversed on appeal after remand due to error in
jury

instructions

[New

Mexico,

case.

1983])

has

some

for new trial, 667 P.2d

striking

similarities

to

972
this

It involved a question of surface water, flooding and an

independent
has

and sent back

a

nondelegable

reference
behind

contractor.

to

the

surface

The Court

duty

toward

waters.

independent

The

contractor

there

found

adjoining
landowner
to

the

landowner

landowners
could

avoid
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not

liability

with
hide
for

negligent

design,

location

and

construction

of

dams

and

culverts the landowner caused to be built upon his property and
which

altered

the

natural

flow or volume of surface waters.

The Court then went on to point out that once the landowner had
artificially collected surface water at a greater volume or at
a greater rate than normal, which caused injury to plaintiff,
negligence was established and the burden shifted to defendant
to prove their defenses.

Budagher v. Amrep Corp., supra.
POINT IV

THERE ARE QUESTIONS OF FACT THAT PRECLUDE
DISPOSITION BY SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
A.

THE DAMAGE TO PROVO CITY WAS NOT FLOOD RELATED.

Artificially

high water

from

normal

runoff

after flood

danger has passed and after high water has peaked is not within
the

governmental

63-30-3.

immunity

provided

by

Utah

Code

Section

This matter predates the legislative redefinition of

governmental

immunity,

and,

even

if

the

definition

were

in

effect, specific waivers apply.
The damage to Provo City was after the normal peak of
Utah Lake and after the high spring runoff period.
deposition, pages 66 and 67.)

(See Kemp

It is a question of fact whether

damage to Provo City property which occurred up to three months
after

the peaking

of Utah

Lake

is "flood"

related

and

thus

whether the immunity of Utah Code Section 63-30-3 applies.
If 1984 had not been a high runoff year, but instead had
been a normal or even a dry year, the damage to Provo City
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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property

would

have been

the

same because

of culverts which

were partially plugged prior to the commencement of construction

and

because

of

the

coffer

dams

which

were

installed

starting March 20, 1984 and were only partially removed due to
the negligence of the contractor.
the east

side of

1-15

freeway

(Kemp deposition, pages

This created high water on

from

172 and

June

until

mid-September

174) three months after the

annual traditional high runoff and Utah Lake peak.

The cause

of the damage was not high water from flooding but a backup
caused

by

freeway.

an

obstruction

in

the

culverts

under

the

1-15

(Kemp deposition, page 198). The determination as to

whether the damage to Provo City property is "flood related" is
therefore a factual one, and disposition by summary judgment as
done by the court below is a premature, unfair disposition of
this matter.
B.

THE FAILURE TO REMOVE

OR THE NEGLIGENT REMOVAL OF

COFFER DAMS WHICH BACKED WATER UP ONTO PROVO CITY PROPERTY IS
AM ACT OF NEGLIGENCE FOR WHICH NO GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY EXISTS.
The

contractor

for

the

State

of Utah was

to

have

the

coffer dams constructed, the culverts extended and the coffer
dams removed before the spring runoff in 1934 (Kemp deposition,
page 189). This work was behind schedule and the coffer dams
were

not

commenced

removed

in

a

timely

manner.

and the water on the Utah Lake

The

spring

runoff

(west) side of 1-15
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freeway covered the top of the culverts (Kemp deposition, page
188; Keyes deposition, page 11).
The coffer dams were removed with a track backhoe that
had a 20-25 foot reach
operator

could

not

(Peterson deposition, page 14) but the

see the underwater

portion of the coffer

dams because of the Utah Lake level (Peterson deposition, pages
21-22; Kemp deposition, page 188).

The UDOT project engineer

acknowledged that the coffer dams became saturated and unstable
so the backhoe could not go out far enough to remove all of the
material
aware

(Keyes deposition, pages 13-14).

there

wasn't

much

flow

through

at

Even though he was
least

one

of

the

culverts the UDOT project manager did not investigate or bring
this problem to anyone's attention.
22-23.)

(Keyes deposition, pages

When the lake level receded, the partial coffer dam

was discovered

(Kemp deposition, page 188) and was high enough

to hold back water on the east side of the 1-15 freeway (Kemp
deposition, pages 171-172).
The Governmental Immunity Act should not be used to cloak
negligence.

Otherwise it would signal a return to the outdated

and discarded
trend

of

concept that

judicial

governmental

"the king can do no wrong."

interpretation

has

immunity and make government

acts just as citizens are.

been

to

The

pierce

responsible for its

The Utah legislature has recognized

this in Utah Code Section 63-30-10 which waives governmental
immunity

for negligence.

This represents a balancing
-29-
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of the

concept that governmental activity needs to be protected so as
to perpetuate government against the concept that the government does not have immunity for some of its negligent acts or
acts

which

Building
which

have

or

only

been

termed

removing

earthen

government

can

governmental function.

proprietary

coffer

perform

dams
and

(pre-Standiford).

is not an activity
is

therefore

not

a

(See Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp,

605 P.2d 1230, 1236-1237 [Utah, 1980].)

Whether or not there

is negligence is a question of fact that should be determined
by a jury rather than by summary disposition under the guise of
governmental immunity.
C.

THE WORK ON 1-15 FREEWAY WAS MOT FLOOD RELATED.

1983 was a year with high moisture and floods for the
State of Utah.

These

conditions

required

many

unprecedented

actions to be taken to deal with the unusual conditions.

1984

was projected to be similar to 1983 as far as the level of Utah
Lake

was

concerned

(Kemp

deposition,

page

98).

It

is

a

question of fact whether or not the 1-15 Freeway diking project
was for the purpose of fighting flood water or for the purpose
of obtaining federal money to get dirt placed along the sides
of the 1-15

freeway for an anticipated

future raising of the

freeway.
The
affidavit

State

of

Utah

attached

of Lonnie V. Gleave

numerous

(Record

letters

292-305)

to

the

in its Reply

Memorandum to Christensen & Griffith's Opposition to its Motion
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for

Summary

Judgment

(Record

332)

diking and flood protection.
flood year.

and

1984.

the

need

for

All of these relate to the 1983

This correspondence was prior to the expected 1983

high water and flooding.
year

indicating

was

not

The freeway survived the 1983 flood

anticipated

to be

(Kemp deposition, page

45)

any more

The

threatened

information

that

in
the

state may have done this freeway work for purposes other than
the diking project Was obtained only recently.

Discovery had

not been undertaken when the State of Utah's Motion for Summary
Judgment

against

Provo

City

was

filed.

The

affidavits

of

William Neff and Earl Kemp are attached hereto and incorporated
herein

by

Exhibit

this

"B"

reference

(Addendum

Exhibit

"Aff

(Addendum

15)

Mr. Neff

and

Mr. Kemp

received

as

16).

and

information from Department of Transportation officials of the
State of Utah that the dikes were being built because of the
availability of federal money and the future needs of the State
of Utah for that dirt to raise the freeway.

Whether the cause

of action can be maintained against the government should not
depend
it.

upon the adjectives used in the Complaint to describe

Hurst v. Highway Department, 397 P.2d 71 (Utah, 1964).
This court recently ruled that the property in question

has

to

be

applicable.

in

the

public

use

for

Utah

Code

63-30-9

to

be

Loveland v. Orem City, 746 P.2d 763 (Utah, 1987).

There can be no question that the 1-15 freeway is in the public
use.
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It is a question of fact whether or not the flooding did
provide the basis for the request but was not the real purpose
for the construction project.

The fact that the State of Utah

called the project flood related is not determinative.
D.
ANY

THE STATE AND/OR

NEGLIGENCE

FROM

ITS

ITS CONTRACTOR

CHOICE

OF

METHOD

IS RESPONSIBLE FOR
IN

EXTENDING

THE

CULVERTS.
As part of the diking project on the 1-15 freeway, the
culverts were to be extended

on either

side of the freeway.

The water level in Utah Lake was expected to go to elevation
4495 which

was the

same

elevation

it

had

gone

to

in 1983.

Staker Paving, as the contractor for the State of Utah, chose
the method of construction in extending
deposition, page 7.)

the culverts.

(Keyes

The method chosen was the use of coffer

dams to hold the water back so that the area could be pumped
dry to do the necessary work for the extensions.
deposition,

pages

construction.
Through

11-12.)

There

were

alternate

(See Keyes
methods

of

(Kemp deposition, pages 161-162.)
getting

behind

on

the

construction

schedule,

(Kemp deposition, page 189; Keyes deposition, pages 39-40) and
with water rising on the Utah Lake side it was difficult, if
not impossible, to remove the earthen coffer dams completely.
(Peterson deposition, pages 21-22; Keyes deposition, page 44).
The UDOT project engineer felt there was still some dike left
underwater

after

Hikiau's

removal

attempt

(Keyes

page 43).
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deposition,

A
arising
caused

contractor
out

of his

the

damage

is

responsible

choice
in

the

of

for

a method

his
of

circumstances

own

negligence

construction

under

employed and it is a question of fact whether

which

that

it

was

the choice of

methods was negligent.
POINT V
PROVO IS ENTITLED TO A TRIAL ON THE MERITS.
The standard for summary judgment is that there must be
no genuine issue of fact raised by the pleadings, depositions,
admissions

on file or affidavits

filed

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c).
the same standard as the trial court.
P.2d

1332, 1334

(Utah, 1977).

by the moving party.

The reviewing court uses
Durham v. Margetts, 571

-The evidence

is considered

in

the light most favorable to the losing party and the summary
judgment will only be affirmed when there is no material issue
of fact, or there is a genuine issue of fact that is contended
by the opposition.
526, 528-29

Theromy v. Sego Enterprises, Inc., 595 P.2d

(Utah, 1979).

Under this standard even though the

State of Utah disagrees with the facts on record, Provo City
would be entitled to a reversal of the summary judgment and to
a hearing on the merits as a matter of law.
10.

CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT

Utah Code Section 63-30-3 does not provide the immunity
found

by

the trial

court

in the Order of January
-33-
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15, 1988.

There

is

apply.

conduct
There

63-30-3.

resolved.

are

There

application

to

of

are
Utah

Granting

v/hich

governmental

immunity

waivers

Utah

specific

questions
Code
the

of

fact

Section

State

of

to

Utah's

Code

which

63-30-3

does

Section

prevent

until

Motion

not

they

for

the
are

Summary

Judgment was error.
The

relief

sought

by

Provo

City

is

for

the

State of

Utah's Summary Judgment to be reversed and this matter remanded
for a trial on the merits.
DATED this

I ^~ S day of June, 1988.
1
i
!
'•^^

GARY L. GREGERSON

\< \--

(/Avvv^ -A"
/^T>?V^
VERNON F. (RICK) ROMNEY

/^.Uu^'f o. LL^,\i
ROBERT D. WEST
Attorneys for Appellant
Provo City Corporation
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11.

ADDENDUM

Description
Order Granding Defendant State of Utah's Motion
for Summary Judgment, dated January 15, 1988
Certification of Order Granting State of Utah's
Summary Judgment Motion as a Final Appealable
Order, dated February 8, 1988
Utah Constitution, Article I Section 7
Utah Constitution, Article I Section 22
United States Constitution, Amendment 5
Utah Code Annotated Section 63-30-2(4)(a)
(Repl. 1986)
Utah Code Annotated Section 63-30-3 (Repl. 1986)
Utah Code Annotated Section 63-30-8 (Repl. 1986)
Utah Code Annotated Section 63-30-9 (Repl. 1986)
Utah Code Annotated Section 63-30-10 (Repl. 1986)
Utah Code Annotated Section 68-3-11 (Repl. 1986)
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2-2(3)(i)
(Repl. 1987)
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(b)
(1953, 1988 ed.)
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(c)
(1953, 1988 ed.)
Affidavit of William Howard Neff, dated May 13,
1988
Affidavit of Earl S. Kemp, dated April 30, 1988
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. 'i i .

''8",
j. -MI

Corporation

responded

to defendant

State

of Utah's motion on

October 16, 1987, and Plaintiff Christensen & Griffith Construction Company responded on November 2, 1987.
Utah filed,

Defendant State of

on October 27, 1987, a reply memorandum addressing

plaintiff Provo City's memorandum and an additional reply memorandum filed on November 18, 1987, addressing plaintiff Christensen

& Griffith

Construction

Company's

memorandum.

read all five memoranda, and having researched

Having

the applicable

law, and for the reasons set forth in the court's two memorandum
decisions dated December 2, 1987 and January 4, 1988, the court
being

fully

advised

in the premises and good

cause appearing

hereby orders, adjudges, and decrees as follows:
1.

Under §63-30-3, U.C.A. (1953 as amended), defen-

dant State of Utah is entitled to immunity from the claims asserted against it in this case.
2.

Defendant State of Utah's motion for summary judg-

ment is hereby granted in total, and plaintiffs' complaint is
hereby

dismissed

with prejudice and upon the merits, and the

cross-claim of Staker Paving and Construction Company is hereby
dismissed with prejudice and upon the merits.
3.

Because

there remains a question

of fact as to

whether or not defendant Staker Paving and Construction Company

-2ADDENDUM 1 CONT.
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acted
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State
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Paving
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hereby
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defendant

for summary

otaker
judgment

day of January, 1988.
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is

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
MAILED, postage prepaid, this

/<Jy _

day of January,

1988, true and correct copies of the foregoing Order Granting
Defendant State of Utah's Motion for Summary Judgment, to the
following:
Gallegos Construction Company
P.O. Box 145*17
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118-0547
Kevin P. McBride
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Third-Party
Defendant Hikiau Construction
Sixth Floor - Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

''lvic/Li-jc.J C iiiCA

_HMO C H R I S T I A N . P C .
OPN/CYS AT LAW
CENTRE I , I 3 0 0
: AST * o o S O U T H
kLT L A K E CITY,
AM e^lil-231.4
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P'LEC

flBuaiH JUDICIAL WSTrXT COUFf
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'-B88FEB II AH

"I "1
A, b

WILLIAM r.HU«S»j/CLIRK
.-DLPUT^

GARY L , GREGERSON ' *: ? ? •! *
Attorney for Pla;::.:* ?:
P.O. Box 1849
Provo, Utah 84 603
(801) 379-614 9

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT Of UTAH COUNTY
STA TE OF UT \E

PROVO CITY CORPORATION,
a municipal corporation
of the State cf Utah and
CHRISTENSEN & GRIFFITH
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY.,

•)
)
)
)
... )
)

Plaintiffs,
vs.

.

)

STATE OF UTAH, by and
through its Department
of Transoortaion, and
STARER PAVING AND
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, .
• ••• -

)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.

• •)

STATE OF UTAH,
Third-party
Plaintiff,
vs .

)
;

)
)
)

GA1LEGOS CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY AND HIKIAU
CONSTRUCT T ON COM-**— ,
T.nirc-party
Defendants.

Civil No. 69608
Judge Ray M. Harding

CERTIFICATION OF ORDER
GRANTING STATE OF UTAH'S
SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION AS
A FINAL.APPEALABLE ORDER

)
)
)
)
)

E)
the Utah Rules
Pursuant to Pule
Digitized by the Howard
r W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Procedure, t.ie OMachine-generated
dpr cater
r.r. errors.
.*~-. a-.*- Januarv
OCR, mayacontain

of Civil
"c
9rM

-2granting the State of Utah's SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION and
dismissing State of Utah as a party defendant in the
above-captioned
matter
is hereby
certified
as a final
appealable order as provided for in Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure against defendant State of Utah only.
There is no just reason for delay of the appeal notwithstanding
the existence of claims remaining against defendant Staker
Paving.
DATED this g ^ ^ d a y of ^Tj^
, 1988.

Mailed a copy of the foregoing Certification of Order
Granting State of Utah f s Summary Judgment Motion as a Final
Appealable Order to Gallegos Construction Company, P.O. Box
14547, Salt Lake City, Utah 84118-0547; to Carmen K. Kipp, 175
East 400 South, #330, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; to Robert H.
Henderson, P.O. Box 45000, Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-4500; to
Bruce L. Richards, P.O. Box 25786, Salt Lake City,. Utah
84126-0786 and to Kevin P. McBride, Sixth Floor Boston
Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, postage prepaid,
this £t,JU
day otjf),^^*
r 1988 .

cr
~'

(T
0r*Ajrv>t~
GARY L.\§REGERS9^, Attorney
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Section [Due process of law.]
VT
~ person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law.
18%
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Section 22. [Private property for public use.]
Private property shall not be taken or damaged
for public use without just compensation.
18%
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AMENDMENT 5
[Criminal actions - Provisions concerning - Due
process of law and just compensation clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia,
when in actual service in time of War or public
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;
nor shall be compellec .. .... criminal case to be a
witness against himself, nor h dennved of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.
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63-30-2.

Definitions.

As used in this chapter:
(1) "Claim" means any claim or cause of action for money or damages
against a governmental entity or against an employee.
(2) "Employee" means any officer, employee, or servant of a governmental entity, whether or not compensated, including student teachers
certificated in accordance with § 53-2-15, educational aides, students engaged in providing services to members of the public in the course of an
approved medical, nursing, or other professional health care clinical
training program, volunteers, and tutors.
^ (3) "Governmental entity" means the state and its political subdivisions as defined in this chapter.
(4) (a) "Governmental function" means any act, failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking of a governmental entity whether or
not the act, failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking is characterized as governmental, proprietary, a core governmental function, unique to government, undertaken in a dual capacity, essential
to or not essential to a government or governmental function, or
could be performed by private enterprise or private persons.
Kb) A "governmental function" may be performed by any department, agency, employee, agent, or officer of a governmental entity.
(5) "Injury" means death, injury to a person, damage to or loss of property, or any other injury that a person may suffer to his person, or estate,
that would be actionable if inflicted by a private person or his agent.
(6) "Personal injury" means an injury of any kind other than property
damage.
(7) "Political subdivision" means any county, city, town, school district,
public transit district, redevelopment agency, special improvement or
taxing district, or other governmental subdivision or public corporation.
(8) "Property damage" means injury to, or loss of, any right, title, estate, or interest in real or personal property.
(9) "State" means the state of Utah, and includes any office, department, agency, authority, commission, board, institution, hospital, college,
university, or other instrumentality of the state.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 2; 1973, ch.
103, § 2; 1978, ch. 27, § 1; 1981, ch. 116, § 1;
1983, ch. 129, § 2; 1987, ch. 75, § 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment alphabetized the definitions of this sec-

tion as set out in the bound volume and renumbered the subsections accordingly, added
present Subsection (4), and made minor
changes in phraseology and punctuation,
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63-30-3,

Immunity of governmental entities from suit.

Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all governmental
entities are immune from suit for any injury which results from the exercise
of a governmental function, governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or
other governmental health care facility, and from an approved medical, nursing, or other professional health care clinical training program conducted in
either public or private facilities.
The management of flood waters and other natural disasters and the construction, repair, and operation of flood and storm systems by governmental
entities are considered to be governmental functions, and governmental entities and their officers and employees are immune from suit for any injury or
damage resulting from those activities.
Historv: L. 1905, eh. 139, § 3; 1978, ch. 27,
$ 2: 1981, ch. 116, § 2; 1984, ch. 33, § 1; 1985,
ch. 93. * 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1981 amendment added "and from an approved medical * *
* or private facilities" to the end of the first
paragraph.

The 1984 amendment, effective March 29,
1984, substituted "chapter" for "act"; and
added the second paragraph.
The 1985 amendment inserted "and other
natural disasters" in the second paragraph.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Constitutionality
Construction and application.
Equitable claims.
Extent of immunity
Failure or omission to act.
Financial institution supervision.
Golf courses.
Health care facilities.
Hospitals.
Misrepresentation by city.
Personal liability.
Proprietary or governmental function
Recreational opportunities provided by city
Right to maintain action
Sewer system backups.
Street repair and construction.
Subdivision plan approval.
Test for determining governmental immunity.
Water system.
Constitutionality.
It is within power of legislature to impose
such conditions upon right to sue cities and
towns, which are merely arms of state government, as in its judgment may seem wise and
proper Berger v. Salt Lake City, 56 Utah 403,
191 P. 233, 13 A.L.R. 5 (1920).
Construction and application.
This section indicates an intention that the
act be strictly applied to preserve sovereign immunity and to waive it only as clearly expressed therein. Holt v. Utah State Rd. Comm.,
30 Utah 2d 4. 511 P.2d 1286 (1973); Epting v.
State, 546 P.2d 242 (Utah 1976).

Failure or omission to act.
This section provides immunity from suit for
injuries resulting from both acts of commission
and omission involving the exercise of a governmental function. Madsert v Borthick, 658
P.2d 627 (Utah 1983).
Financial institution supervision.
State's supervision of financial institutions
is of such a unique nature that it can only be
performed by a governmental agency and constitutes the exercise of a governmental function. Madsen v. Borthick. 658 P.2d 627 (Utah
1983).

Equitable claims.
Governmental immunity is not a defense to
equitable claims. Bowles v. State ex rel. Department of Transp., 652 P.2d 1345 (Utah
1982).

Golf courses.
Operation of a public golf course is not essential to governing and is therefore not a governmental operation with result that city is not
immune from tort liability related to its operation of golf course. Standiford v. Salt Lake City
Corp., 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980).

Extent of immunity
Classification of operation of governmental
entity as "governmental function" does not signal unconditional immunity und6r this section
since the grant of immunity is expressly subjected to operation of other sections of this act.
Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980)

Health care facilities.
While 1978 amendment was not expressly
made retroactive, the supreme court was disinclined, as a matter of judicial policy, to disregard the obvious manifestation of legislative
intent reflected in the amendment; for that
reason, the court held, in a case which arose
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prior to the amendment, that operation of a
governmentally owned health care facility
such as a university medical center was a "governmental function" as contemplated by the
statute prior to amendment. Frank v. State.
613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980».

from the exercise of a governmental function,
or from a finding that even though the injury
resulted from the exercise of a governmental
function, the government's immunity has been
expresslv waived. Madsen v. Borthick. 658
P.2d 627 (Utah 1983).

Hospitals.
The state's operation of a hospital at a prison
facility for treatment of prisoners is a governmental function. Madsen v. State, 583 P.2d 92
(Utah 1978).
The function of a municipality in the operation of a city hospital is proprietary and not
within the coverage of this act. Greenhaigh v.
Payson City, 530 P.2d 799 (Utah 1975).

Sewer system b a c k u p s .
Governmental immunity was not a bar to an
action by property owner against city for damage sustained when water backed into his
home due to city's alleged negligence in maintaining the sewer system. Thomas v. Clearfield
City. 642 P.2d 737 (Utah 1982).
An action for negligence against a sanitary
district is not subject to the one-year limitations period for actions against the government, since operation of a sewer system is a
nongovernmental function, and thus not protected by governmental immunity. Dalton v.
Salt Lake Sub. San. Dist., 676 P.2d 399 (Utah
1984).

Misrepresentation by city.
City is immune to tort action for deceit and
misrepresentation in its advertisement for construction bids which failed to disclose to bidders that a competitive advantage had been
granted to one corporation. Rapp v. Salt Lake
City, 527 P.2d 651 (Utah 1974).
Personal liability.
The Governmental Immunity Act has no application to individuals: however, under common-law principles, a governmental agent performing a discretionary function is immune
from suit for injury arising therefrom, but an
employee acting in a ministerial capacity is not
so protected: psychologist working with university medical center on contractual basis and
alleged to have been negligent in his treatment
of suicidal patient was performing ministerial
rather than discretionary acts, and thus was
not afforded immunity from suit. Frank v.
State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980).

Street repair and construction.
Duty of city to repair or construct streets
within its corporate limits is a governmental
one, and in absence of statute no liability devolves on municipality- for defective condition
of its streets. Niblock v. Salt Lake City, 100
Utah 573, 111 P.2d 800 (1941) (decided under
former law).
Subdivision plan approval.
City was immune from a damage suit based
on its refusal to approve a subdivision plan,
since its actions were deemed to be a "governmental function." Seal v. Mapleton Citv, 598
P.2d 1346 (Utah 1979).

Right to maintain action.
The right to maintain an action against the
state or its political subdivisions can result
from a finding that the injury did not result

Test for determining governmental immunity.
Test for determining governmental immunity is whether the activity under consideration is of such a unique nature that it can
only be performed by a governmental agency
or that it is essential to the core of governmental activity; this new standard broadens governmental liability. However, the position is
consistent with the plain legislative intent of
this chapter to expand governmental liability.
Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d
1230 (Utah 1980).
Test for determining governmental immunity is whether the activity under consideration is of such a unique nature that it can
only be performed by a governmental agency,
referring not to what government may do but
to what government alone must do, or that it is
essential to the core of governmental activity,
referring to those activities not unique in
themselves but essential to the performance of
those activities that are uniquely governmental. Johnson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 629 P.2d
432 (Utah 1981).

Water system.
Where city operated water system as a commercial venture in a proprietary capacity, it
was liable for injuries allegedly suffered by

plaintiff when she stepped on loose water
meter lid whether the meter was on plaintiff's
property or in the street. Gordon v. Provo City,
15 Utah 2d 287. 391 P.2d 430 '1964).

P r o p r i e t a r y or governmental function.
Four factors to be considered in determining
whether the operation of a hospital is a proprietary or a governmental function are: (1)
whether the activity is something which is
done for the general public good: (2) whether it
is generally regarded as a public responsibility: (3) whether there is any special pecuniary
benefit to the city; and (4) whether it is in competition with free enterprise. Greenhaigh v.
Payson City, 530 P.2d 799 (Utah 1975).
Recreational opportunities provided by
city.
Governmental immunity was not a bar to a
negligence action against a city for injuries
sustained by a child when child's sled collided
with a post on a city owned golf course that
was open to the public for sledding in the winter months. Johnson v. Salt Lake City Corp.,
629 P.2d 432 (Utah 1981).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Defining Governmental Function Under the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act, 9 Journal of
Contemporary Law 193 (1983).
A.L.R. — Liability of municipality for personal injury or death under mob violence or
anti-lynching statutes, 26 A.L.R.3d 1142.

Liability of municipality for property damage under mob violence statutes. 26 A.L.R.3d
1198.
Modern status of rule excusing governmental unit from tort liability on theory that only
general, not particular, duty was owed under
circumstances, 38 A.L.R.4th 1194.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
ADDENDUM 7 CONT.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

63-30-8. Waivei of immunity for Injury c;HJSe<* . *;- enM V<• tive, unsafe, or dangerous condition of highways,
bridges, or other structures.
Immunity from suit o( all governmental entities is waived for any injury
caused by a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any highway, road,
street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct or other
structure located thereon.
History: L. 1965, ch. 133, § 8.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Complaint, sufficiency of allegations.
Construction.
Contributory negligence.
Dangerous objects.
Discretionary function.
Ice and snow on sidewalk.
Manholes.
Negligent construction.
New duties not created.
Nondelegable duty.

*

Complaint, sufficiency of allegations.
Claim for injuries "sustained on or about
January 15. 1902. while walking on the sidewalk along First West street between Seventh
and Eighth South, * * * through the negligence
of the city in suffering * * * a fence * * * to be
on said sidewalk." not having misled the city,
was sufficiently definite. Connor v. Salt Lake
City. 28 Utah 248. 78 P. 479 (1904).
Where plaintiff sustained damages to his automobile on city streets, and presented a claim
for "necessary repairs to automobile $133," he
cannot claim and recover additional damages
for $1,000 for its "depreciation in value and
general impairment," since such claim was not
included in original claim, and could not be
said to be proximate consequence of injuries
therein included. Sweet v. Salt Lake City, 43
Utah 306. 134 P. 1167 (1913).
In suit for personal injuries sustained by falling on sidewalk of defendant city, plaintiff
could not recover for permanent injuries in excess of amount claimed in notice to city on
ground that injuries were more serious than at
first supposed, where she alleged no excuse
why she could not initially state all conse(jiii'nci'M of injurifH descrilnMl in complaint. Ri*rgur v. Salt Lake City,.% Utah, 10.'! I'M P. 233,
13 A.L.R. 5 (1920).

Discretionary function.
Power of public service commission under
§ 54-4-14 to require public utility to construct
and maintain appropriate safety devices at
grade crossings is a discretionary function, and
$ 63-30-10 excepts the commission from
waiver of immunity for injuries caused by failure to require warnings at crossing. Velasquez
v Union Pac. R.R., 24~Utah 2d 217, 469 P.2d 5
• 1970).
The design of a system of traffic-control
semaphores did not involve "the basic policy
making level" nor constitute a discretionaryact for which § 63-30-10 would provide immunity to the state in a tort action alleging
dangerously designed, constructed and maintained electric traffic-control
semaphore
caused an auto accident resulting in personal
injury. Bigelow v. Ingersoll, 618 P.2d 50 (Utah
1980),

Construction.
A city is required to exercise reasonable care
to keep its streets in safe condition and may be
held liable for injuries proximately resulting
from failure to do so and. in an action against
city for injuries, the failure of a city to warn of
or protect a row of dirt left in the street during
the installation of a curb and gutter justified
finding that city was negligent. Nyman v. Cedar City, 12 Utah 2d 45, 361 P 2d 1.114 (1961)

Manholes,
A city was liable for damages sustained
when right rear wheel of automobile crashed
through a defective manhole lid where the city
was negligent in failing to maintain street in a
reasonably safe condition for vehicular traffic
by allowing a broken and cracked manhole lid
to remain in the street. Wilson v. Salt Lake
City, 13 Utah 2d 234, 371 P.2d 644 (1962).

Contributory negligence.
Ordinarily, a pedestrian with prior knowledge of a sidewalk defect and an unobstructed
daylight view who steps into a visible defect is
contributorily negligent as a matter of law.
Eisner v. Salt Lake Citv, 120 Utah 675, 238
P.2d 416 (1951).
In order that a temporary forgetfulness may
be excused, the cause diverting a pedestrian's
attention from a known danger in a sidewalk
must be unexpected and substantial. Otherwise, the forgetfulness itself may constitute
contributory negligence. Eisner v. Salt Lake
City, 120 Utah 675, 238 P.2d 416 (1951).
Dangerous objects.
It is primary duty of city to exercise reasonable care to maintain streets in reasonably safe
condition, and to guard against injury to persons and property by removing or making reasonably safe any dangerous objects in streets.
Morris v. Salt Lake City, 35 Utah 474, 101 P.
373 (1909).

Ice and snow on sidewalk.
Cities and towns are not liable for failure to
keep sidewalks free from natural accumulations of ice and snow, but may be held liable for
injuries arising from such snow and ice upon
streets or sidewalks which are placed there by
thrir own acts. IVtgrr v. Hull Lnkr Citv, f>(>
Utah 403, 191 P. 233, 13 A.L.U. 5 (1920)
(decided under former law).

Negligent construction.
Where university construction diverted flow
of surface water, flooding basement and causing other damage to adjoining landowner, governmental immunity was waived and university was liable to landowner. Sanford v. University of Utah, 26 Utah 2d 285, 488 P.2d 741
(Utah 197 1 ).
There was adequate evidence to support, jury
finding that highway project of the state, including the storm drain system, was unnecessarily defective or dangerous and had resulted
in damage to plaintiffs' property by diversion
of rainwater from channels which had previously carried it to points beyond the plaintiffs'
properties. Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d 1117
(Utah 1975).
New duties not created.
This section did not create any new duties
but merely waived immunity, and since county
had no duty to correct conditions on private
property that obstructed motor bike driver's
view of county road, it could not be held liable
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63-30-9. Waiver of immunity for injury from dangerous or
defective public building, structure, or other
public improvement — Exception.
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for any injury
caused from a dangerous or defective condition of any public building, structure, dam, reservoir or other public improvement. Immunity is not waived for
latent defective conditions.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 9.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Latent defective condition.
Legislative intent.
Negligent construction.
Notice to city.
Other public improvement.
Latent defective condition.
Defect in a county storm drain that was discoverable by a reasonable inspection was not a
latent defect. Vincent v. Salt Lake County, 583
P.2d 105 (Utah 1978).

ing other damage to adjoining landowner, governmental immunity was waived and university was liable to landowner. Sanford v. University of Utah, 26 Utah 2d 285, 488 P.2d 741
(1971).

Legislative intent.
Intent of legislature was to include within
the waiver of immunity an action for private
nuisance in so far as the action is predicated on
a dangerous or defective condition of a public
improvement that unreasonably interferes
with the use and enjoyment of the claimant's
property. Sanford v. University of Utah, 26
Utah 2d 285. 488 P.2d 741 (1971).

Notice to city.
Requirement that notice of claim be given to
political subdivision within ninety days (now
one year) in § 63-30-13 is applicable to this
section. Parrish v. Layton City Corp., 542 P.2d
1086 (Utah 1975) (decided under former law).

Negligent construction.
Where university construction diverted flow
of surface water, flooding basement and caus-

Other public improvement.
Damages to house and basement partially
incurred from defective conditions of sewer
drain and canal fell under purview of this section. Parrish v. Layton City Corp., 542 P.2d
1086 (Utah 1975).
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63-30-10

Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negligent act or omission of employee — Exceptions —
Waiver for injury caused by violation of fourth
amendment rights.

(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed
within the scope of employment except if the injury:
(a) arises out of the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused;
or
(b) arises out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander,
deceit, interference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or
civil rights; or
(c) arises out of the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, or by
the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke, any permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization; or
(d) arises out of a failure to make an inspection, or by reason of making
an inadequate or negligent inspection of any property; or
(e) arises out of the institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative proceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause; or
(0 arises out of a misrepresentation by the employee whether or not it
is negligent or intentional; or
(g) arises out of or results from riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations, mob violence, and civil disturbances; or
(h) arises out of or in connection with the collection of and assessment
of taxes; or
(i) arises out of the activities of the Utah National Guard; or
(j) arises out of the incarceration of any person in any state prison,
county, or city jail or other place of legal confinement; or
(k) arises from any natural condition on state lands or the result of any
activity authorized by the State Land Board; or
(1) arises out of the activities of providing emergency medical assistance, fighting fire, handling hazardous materials, or emergency evacuations.
(2) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury
proximately caused or arising out of a violation of protected fourth amendment rights as provided in Chapter 16, Title 78 which shall be the exclusive
remedy for injuries to those protected rights. If § 78-16-5 or Subsection
77-35-12(g) or any parts thereof are held invalid or unconstitutional, this
Subsection (2) shall be void and governmental entities shall remain immune
from suit for violations of fourth amendment rights.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 10; 1975, ch.
194, § 11; 1982, ch. 10, § 1; 1985, ch. 169, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1982 amendment designated the former section as Subsection(l); substituted letters for numbers as subdivision designations; and added Subsection
(2).

The 1985 amendment, effective March 18,
1985, added Subsection (1)(1) and made minor
changes in phraseology,
Cross-References. — Indemnification of
public officers and employees, §§ 63-30-36 to
53 3Q 33
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and placed her in foster care. Little v. Utahh
State Div. of Family Servs., 667 P.2d 49 (Utahh
1983).
Incarceration in state prison.
The exception of the waiver of governmental•
immunity for injuries arising out of the incar-\
ceration of a person in the state prison does not
constitute a denial of equal protection nor is it
against public policv. Madsen v. State, 583„
P2d 92 (Utah 1978).
This section barred a wrongful death action
against the state and board of corrections for
[
death of a prisoner due to alleged negligent
treatment of the prisoner after surgery in thee
prison hospital. Madsen v. State, 583 P.2d 922
(Utah 1978).
State is immune under Subsection (10) (nowv
(l)(j)) of this section from claim of inmate forr
negligent deprivation of property, but individ-1ual employees of the state are not immune.••
Schmitt v. Billings, 600 P.2d 516 (Utah 1979).>•
Individual agents' immunity.
Under subsection (10) (now (l)(j)) of this section, individual defendants are not immunee
from liability for their own torts. Schmitt v.
'
Billings, 600 P.2d 516 (Utah 1979).
Psychologist working with university medi-"
cal center on contractual basis and alleged to0
have been negligent in his treatment of sui-"
cidal patient was acting in a ministerial ratherr
than discretionary capacity and thus was notlfc
immune from suit. Frank v. State, 613 P.2d
d
517 (Utah 1980).

of "basic policy evaluation" as to make it a discretionary decision under Subsection (1) (now
(lNaO of this section, but rather the decision to
sell was an operation function and not immune
from attack; also, since defendant tax commission never claimed taxes were owing on the
motorcycle and no taxes were deducted from
the sale price, and since the motorcycle was
being held as evidence in a criminal prosecution, the commission could not claim immunity
on basis of the tax exception under Subsection
(8) (now (l)(h)) of this section. Morrison v. Salt
Lake City Corp.. 600 P.2d 553 (Utah 1979).
State hospital patient.
State was immune from liability for wrongful death of patient who voluntarily entered
state hospital since she was "incarcerated" or
"confined" within the meaning of this section;
"other place of legal confinement" includes the
hospital. The fact that decedent was voluntary
patient did not preclude conclusion that she
was "incarcerated" since she had not sought
release and had she done so, superintendent
could obtain court order preventing her release. Emery v. State, 26 Utah 2d 1. 483 P.2d
1296 (1971).

Legislative intent.
3
Since the waiver of immunity in § 63-30-8
and § 63-30-9 encompasses a much broaderr
field of tort liability than merely negligent con{.
,.
duct of employees within the scope of their employment, the Legislature could not have in-t .
tended that this section, with its exceptions,5>
should modify the preceding two sections evenn
though it be conceded that the negligent con-i.
duct of an employee might be involved in ann
action for injuries caused by the creation orr
maintenance of a dangerous or defective condi-j.
tion. Sanford v. University of Utah, 26 Utah 2dd
285, 488 P.2d 741 (1971).

State prison inmate. * *
Complaint of inmate of state prison for damages from injuries inflicted by fellow prisoner
was properly dismissed as to state which is
governmental entity within meaning of statute
defining "governmental entity" and because
statute waiving sovereign immunity from negligent acts of all governmental entities specifically excepts injuries arising out of the incarceration of any person in any state prison from
the operation of the statute; although warden
of state prison is not "governmental entity"
within statute and consequently was not immune from suit for alleged negligence, complaint against him was properly dismissed under common-law rule that where one inmate
has injured another, warden and other prison
officers are protected by doctrine of sovereign
immunity against claims of negligence so long
as thev are acting in good faith. Sheffield v.
Turner, 21 Utah 2d 314, 445 P.2d 367 (1968).

Misrepresentation in advertisement.
City is immune to tort action for deceit andd
imisrepresentation in its advertisement for con1struction bids which failed to disclose to bidders that a competitive advantage had beenn
granted to one corporation. Rapp v. Salt Lakee
City, 527 P.2d 651 (Utah 1974).

Trees negligently cut.
City and sidewalk contractor were liable for
damage sustained by abutting homeowner
when trees were blown down as result of unnecessarv and negligent cutting of roots. Morris v. Salt Lake Citv, 35 Utah 474. 101 P. 373
(1909).

Sale of recovered stolen property.
Where plaintiffs motorcycle was stolen, re»covered, held for trial of alleged thief, then soldd
by State Tax Commission without notice too
plaintiff (who never received notice letter), thee
motorcycle's sale did not involve such exercisee

University medical center.
State's immunity from suit was waived under this section in action alleging negligent
treatment of suicidal patient by psychiatrist
and psychologist at university medical center,
Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Reviews. — Misapplication of
Governmental Immunitv — Epting v. Utah
1976 Utah L. Rev. 186."
A.L.R. — Liability of municipality for building inspector's negligent performance of duties,
41 A.L.R.3d 567.

Validity and construction of statute authorizing or requiring governmental unit to indemnify public officer or employee for liability
arising out of performance of public duties, 71
A.L.R.3d 90.
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68-3-11. Rules < : >f < construction,, as U > words and phrases.
Words and phrases are to be construed according to the context and the
approved usage of the language; but technical words and phrases, and such
others as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law, or are
defined by statute, are to be construed according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning or definition.
History: R.S. 1,898 & C.L. ISO?,, § 2437;
C.L. 1917, § 3847; R.S 1933 & C 1943,,
88-2-11.

Cross-References. — Duty of court to construe statutes, § 78-21-3.

NOTES r o DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Construction and application,
Court's duty.
Meaning of word "maintain/'
Meaning of word "may."
Supplying omissions.
Title of act.
Words used repeatedly in statute.
stood., Emmertson v, State Tax Comm'n, 93
Construction a n d application.
Utah 219. 72 P.2d 467, 113 A.L.R. 1174 (1937).
Where there is doubt respecting true meaning of certain words, then words should be read
Court's duty.
in light of conditions and necessities which
It is duty of courts to enforce plain, intent of
they are intended to meet and objects sought to
be attained thereby. United States Smelting, statute, but courts ought not to construe an act
to effect the forfeiture of property of one citizen
Refining & Milling Co. v. Utah Power & Light
to another, unless "plain and unequivocal
Co., 58 Utah 168, 197 P 902 (1921).
mandate of the Legislature admits of no other
Presumption is that words are used in their rational construction/' Rospigliosi v. Glenallen
ordinary sense and if a different interpretation Mining Co., 69 Utah 41, 252 P. 276 (1926) (conis sought it must rest upon something in the struing usury statute).
character of the legislation or in the context
In construction of statutes it is duty of courts
which will justify a different meaning. Deseret
to ascertain intent of legislative body, and in
Sav. Bank v. Francis, 62 Utah 35, 217 P. 1114
determining this intent, not only should lan(1923).
guage of act be considered, but also purposes
Unless technical terms are used, words em- and objects sought by Legislature, and if legisployed in statute must be given their usual and
lation is within constitutional power, to enordinary meaning. Cache Auto Co. v. Central
force such intent. Price v. Tuttle, 70 Utah 156,
Garage, 63 Utah 10, 221 P. 862, 30 A.L.R. 1217
258 P. 1016 (1927).
(1923).
It is court's duty, when possible, to give to
Meaning of words found in statute must be
every word, phrase, clause, and sentence of
determined from general context of the same statute a consistent, reasonable meaning. Roband the intent or object sought to be accom- inson v. Union Pac. R.R., 70 Utah 441, 261 P. 9
plished by the legislation, and courts in at- (19271
tempting to arrive at the intent of the LegislaMeaning of word "maintain."
ture will disregard mere forms and look to the
In applying this section to the construction of
substance. State v. Franklin, 63 Utah 442, 226
word 'maintain," the court said that that
P. 674 (1924).
which is contained in statute by implication is
Words and phrases are to be construed according to the context and the approved usage as much part of statute as that which expressly
appears therein. Merrill v. Spencer, 14 Utah
of the language; except in case of technical
words and phrases, they must be construed ac- 273, 46 P. 1096 (1896).
cording to their plain and ordinary meaning,
Meaning of w o r d "may."
but technical rules of construction may be disWord ''may" as used in § 78-56-10, providing
regarded where it is manifest, when the subject
that judge of city court "may" employ shortof legislation, considered from all points of
hand reporter upon request of any party,
view, is such as to convince the understanding
should be construed as discretionary, not manthat the Legislature could not have intended a
datory. Purcell v. Wilkins, 57 Utah 467,195 P.
literal interpretation. State v. Hendrickson, 67
547 (1921).
Utah 15, 245 P. 375, 57 A.L.R. 786 (1926).
This section is merely declaratory of pre-ex- Supplying omissions.
isting rules of statutory construction. State v.
In construing statutes court may supply
Navaro, 83 Utah 6, 26 P.2d 955 (1933).
manifest omissions in order to avoid absurd
Definition of word may depend upon the and mischievous consequences and to effect
character of its use in a statute. State v. legislative intent. Gunnison Sugar Co. v. PubNavaro, 83 Utah 6, 26 P.2d 955 (1933).
lic Utils. Comm'n, 69 Utah 521, 256 P. 790
Unless contrary appears, terms of legislative (1927).
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of statute, and words which are obviously necessary to complete sense will be supplied to
effect a meaning clearly shown by other parts
of statute. Chez ex rel. Weber College v. Utah
State Bldg. Comm'n, 93 Utah 538, 74 P.2d 687
(1937).
Title of act.
While it is true that the title is not integrated into the operating portion of legislation,
and that it will not be permitted to contradict
or defeat a plainly expressed intent, and that
such title cannot be used to create an ambiguity or uncertainty when the language in the
body of the "act is clear, nevertheless, where
clarity is lacking in the language of an enactment, the title may be considered to shed light
upon and clarify the meaning. Great Salt Lake
Auth. v. Island Ranching Co., 18 Utah 2d 45,
414 P.2d 963 (1966).

Words used repeatedly in statute.
Word repeatedly used in statute will be presumed to bear same meaning throughout statute, unless there is something to show that another meaning was intended. Merrill v. Spencer, 14 Utah 273, 46 P. 1096 (1896); State v.
Tingey, 24 Utah 225, 67 P. 33 (1902).
The same words, especially if found in different statutes, may not always have the same
effect, and it follows that in order to determine
intention and purpose of lawmaker, and to harmonize conflicting provisions where such occur, it at times becomes necessary for courts to
expand or to restrict ordinary and usual meaning of words, phrases, or clauses found in particular section or statute. Board of Educ. of
Carbon County School Dist. v. Bryner, 57 Utah
78, 192 P. 627 (1920).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes
§§ 204, 225 to 227, 238, 250.
C.J.S. — 82 C.J.S. Statutes §§ 314, 315, 329,
330, 348.

Key Numbers. — Statutes «=> 178, 179, 188,
192, 208.
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78-2-2.
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(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of
state law certified by a court of the United States,
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in cases originating in:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
(iii) the Board of State Lands;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mm. u n;p
(v) the state engineer;
(f) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution;
(g) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of
a first degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; and
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction,
except for the following matters:
(a.) first degree and capital felony convictions;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts:
(d) retention or removal of public officers;
(e) general water adjudication;
(f) taxation and revenue; and
(gj those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (h).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals
under Subsection (3)(b).
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Rule 54. Judgments; costs.
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree
and any order from which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a
recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings.
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties.
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an
express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated,
which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of
fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the
claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision
at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the
rights and liabilities of all the parties.
(c) D e m a n d for judgment.
(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the
party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not
demanded such relief in his pleadings. It may be given for or against one
or more of several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case
requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as
between or among themselves.
(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not be different
in kind from, or exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in the
demand for judgment.
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JIuli" iiVI'i, „! n u m m a r y j u d g m e n t
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a, claim., counterclaim., or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summai y judgment in his favor upon, all or any
part thereof.
(b) For defending party, A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
fd) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
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GARY L. GREGERSON (#1254)
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
Provo City Corporation
P.O. Box 1849
Provo, Utah 34503
Teleohone: (801) 379-6140
:HE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

PROVO CITY CORPORATION,
et a l . ,
P l a i n t i f f s and
Appellants,

AFFIDAVIT OF
WILLIAM HOWARD NEFF

vs.

STATE OF UTAH, et al.,

Docket Number 880083

Defendants and
Respondents.

STATE OF UTAH,
ss.
COUNTY OF UTAH.

)

WILLIAM HOWARD NEFF being first duly sworn deposes and
states as follows:
1. My name is William Howard Neff.
2. I am a golf course architect and have been a member
of the American Society of Golf Course Architects since 1971.
I obtained a degree in architecture from the University of Utah
in 1958. Since 1981 I have been self-employed and involved in
various and numerous golf course projects.
3. In 1984 I obtained a contract to build a golf course
for Provo City, which I did by putting together a group called
the "Neff Alliance."
4. During the course of the golf course construction, I
interacted and dealt with Utah Department of Transportation
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated
OCR, may contain
errors.
ADDENDUM
15

-2personnel as they had an 1-15 construction project adjacent to
and bordering on the golf course construction project.
5,

During the course of that project, I was told by Utah

Department of Transportation personnel that the dikes or berms
built along the 1-15 freeway were to serve a dual purpose as
they wanted to come in later and raise the freeway.
DATED this

\p

dav of May, 1933.

Am^^WwTfli,'
t

wI L L M l
Subscribed

HQW?tf>D.NEFF

and sworn t o b e f o r e me t h i s

I A

1988.

4?£^
My Commission Expires

7-30-?.
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day of May,

GARY L. GREGERSON (#1254)
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
Provo City Corporation
P.O. Box 1849
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 379-6140
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

PROVO CITY CORPORATION,
et al. ,
Plaintiffs and
Appellants,

AFFIDAVIT OF EARL S. KEMP

vs.
STATE OF UTAH, et al.,

Docket Number 880083

Defendants and
Respondents.

STATE OF UTAH,

ss.

COUNTY OF UTAH.

)

EARL S. KEMP being first duly sworn deposes and states as
follows:
1. My name is Earl S. Kemp.
2.
I am a licensed professional engineer, licensed in
the states of Utah, Idaho and Wyoming. I have been employed as
a professional engineer for approximately eleven years.
I
obtained a Bachelor of Science Degree in Civil Engineering from
the Brigham Young University in 1973 and a Master's in Civil
Engineering from Utah State University in 1979.
3.

I

Engineering

am

currently

employed

by

Forsgren-Perkins

and have been employed by them for

ten years.
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approximately

4.
Forsgren-Perkins contracted with Neff Alliance for
consulting engineering work to build a golf course for and in
Provo City. I was assigned as the consulting engineer and in
that capacity was on the site of the golf course construction
and on the site of the Utah Department of Transportation
project along 1-15 between the Ironton-Springville off-ramp and
the University off-ramp, a part of which is adjacent to the
golf course construction. In that capacity, I interacted and
dealt with Utah Department of Transportation personnel on the
diking
project
and
observed
conditions
and
construction
firsthand.
5.
I was advised by people from UDOT that they could
obtain no federal money for diking but they could get federal
money for elevating the roadway. Because of this, it is my
understanding from what I was told, that UDOT built the dike
along 1-15 for material to do a later elevation of the roadway.
6.
An elevation of the freeway road bed could serve
several purposes. It could be used in an effort to put the
freeway at a height so it would not be subject to a rise in the
level of Utah Lake or flooding.
It could also be used to
improve the freeway as an increased base makes a better roadway.
DATED this
^° day of April, 1988.

EARL S. KEMP
Subscribed

and

sworn

to

before

me

this J?>c) -^ day

April, 1988.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I

hereby

certify

that

I caused

to

be mailed, postage

prepaid, four true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of
Plaintiff/Appellant Provo City to the following on the / - '
of June, 1988.

Bruce L. Richards
Bruce L. Richards & Associates
Attorneys for Christensen &
Griffith Construction
P.O. Box 26786
Salt Lake City, Utah 84126-0786
Robert H. Henderson
Snow, Chirstensen & Martineau
Attorneys for Staker Paving
& Construction Company
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Carmen E. Kipp
Robert H. Rees
Kipp and Christian, P.C.
Attorneys for State of Utah
and DOT
City Centre I, #330
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314
Gallegos Construction Company
P.O. Box 14547
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118-0547
Kevin McBride
39 Exchange Place, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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